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INTRODUCTION
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB Act) of 1999 removed
legal barriers that had existed between different kinds of financial institutions.1 Where legal walls once blocked mergers
among banks, brokerage houses, insurance companies, and
other financial entities, the GLB Act permits the creation of
t Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
tt Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Copyright 2002 by Edward J.
Janger, Paul M. Schwartz and the MinnesotaLaw Review.
1. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
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new kinds of "financial supermarkets." This law also sought to
provide new rules for financial privacy. 2 To limit the possible
negative results of data processing by the financial supermarkets, the GLB Act sought to provide "the most comprehensive
3
federal privacy legislation in history."
Only a few years after the GLB Act's enactment, however,
it appears to have failed as far as privacy protection is concerned. The Act has pleased neither privacy advocates nor the
financial industry. The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, for example, has stated of the mandatory privacy notices under the
GLB Act, "Industry, government agencies, and consumer education organizations ... would all do well to view the year 2001
as a costly experiment that resulted in little effective education
of the public about the rights to privacy of personal financial
information under GLB."4 This conclusion has been echoed by
Federal Trade Commission Chairman Timothy Muris, who
summarized the net result of GLB privacy notices in these
terms: "Acres of trees died to produce a blizzard of barely comprehensible privacy notices." 5 It may, in fact, be a rare legislative feat to have a single statute create so many diverse critics
so quickly.
This Article examines the roots of the unhappiness with
the GLB Act. It explores the GLB Act and its shortcomings
through reference to and refinement of theoretical work regarding the law of incomplete contracts. The key scholarship concerns information sharing and "defaults," or background rules,
for filling gaps in agreements. 6 We explore three possible kinds

2. These protections are found in Title V of the GLB Act. 15 U.S.C. §§
501-509, 521-527 (2000).
3. L. Richard Fischer & Clarke Dryden Camper, Reform Law and Privacy: A Road Map, AM. BANKER, Nov. 19, 1999, at 6.
4. Tena Friery & Beth Givens, 2001: The GLB Odyssey-We're Not There
Yet, at http'/www.privacyrights.org/ar/fp-glb-ftc.htm (Dec. 4, 2001).
5. Timothy J. Muris, ProtectingConsumers'Privacy:2002 and Beyond, at
http'//www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/privispl002.htm (Oct. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
Muris, ProtectingPrivacy].
6. Privacy scholars have already begun to make use of the concept of default and mandatory rules. See Jerry Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions,50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246-67 (1998); Richard Murphy,
Property Rights in PersonalInformation:An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84
GEo. L.J. 2381, 2402-04 (1996); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics
of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 53-67 (1997) [hereinafter Schwartz, PrivacyEconomics]; Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No
Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L.
REV. 1033, 1101-13 (1999).
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of defaults: majoritarian, information forcing, and norm enforcing. Our chief focus is on the GLB Act's requirements of notice
plus "opt-out" before data sharing with non-affiliates. 7 As a result of the GLB Act's opt-out default, information may be
shared with non-affiliates unless consumers, after notice, object
to the practice. In contrast, under a privacy opt-in, information
would not be shared with third parties unless consumers
agreed to the practice.
This Article finds that the GLB Act's privacy safeguards
are highly problematic as examples of either a majoritarian or
information forcing default. The GLB Act also raises difficulties if evaluated as a background rule that seeks to enforce
norms. In our judgment, information privacy should be conceptualized as a norm constitutive of a democratic society. 8 The
access to personal information and limits on it help form the
nature of the society in which we live and shape our individual
identities. For example, the structure of access to personal information can have a decisive impact on the extent to which
certain actions or expressions of identity are encouraged or discouraged.
Our concept of "constitutive privacy" suggests that information privacy is a kind of commons that requires some degree
of social control to construct and preserve. Default rules, when
viewed from this normative perspective, should have a limited
role in norm enforcement because of the current poor functioning of the privacy market between consumers and financial institutions. In particular, the presence of bounded rationality
along with coordination problems makes default rules a risky
choice in this context of information privacy. Under such conditions, the law should generally seek to minimize harms that
flow from reliance on bargaining among consumers and data
processors.
In this Article's final section, we explore a manner in which
to make the GLB Act's mandatory rules more flexible, and we
propose possible revisions to the existing "notice and opt-out"
default in the GLB Act. 9 Mandatory rules can avoid the flaws
of command and control regulations through the use of negotiated "safe harbor" agreements between oversight agencies and
industry. We look to the Children's Online Privacy Protection
7. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(a)-(b). Section (a) deals with notice
while section (b) deals with opt-out provisions.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part 1.C.
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Act of 1998 as providing a model in this regard. 10 Finally, we
revisit the GLB Act's opt-out requirement. We propose to improve upon this requirement by using social science research
concerning the power of "frames." We also discuss the possible
merits of a shift to an opt-in requirement.
I. THE GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY ACT
In this Part, we describe the GLB Act in both its nonprivacy dimensions and its Title V's privacy-protective aspects.
We then explore the current grounds for widespread discontent
with the GLB Act's information privacy safeguards.
A. NON-PRIVACY ASPECTS TO THE STATUTE

The GLB Act overturned legal barriers that existed among
different kinds of financial institutions. In particular, it repealed essential elements of the Glass-Steagall Act, enacted
during the Great Depression, and the later Bank Holding Company Act, first enacted in 1956 and amended significantly in
1982.11 The Glass-Steagall Act prevented banks that were
members of the Federal Reserve System from affiliating with
companies that underwrote, sold, or distributed securities. The
Bank Holding Act generally blocked a bank from controlling a
non-bank company. Amendments to it in 1982 prevented
banks from conducting insurance underwriting or insurance
agency activities. 12 These statutes erected legal barriers between the commercial banking, securities, and insurance industries.
10. Children's Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15 U.S.C. §§ 65016506 (2000).
11. The GLB Act repeals sections of the Banking (Glass-Steagall Act) Act
of 1933. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 101. The critical sections of the GlassSteagall Act, sections 20 and 32, restricted banks and security firms from affiliating with each other. Neal R. Pandozzi, Beware of Banks Bearing Gifts:
Gramm-Leach-Bliley and the Constitutionality of Federal FinancialPrivacy
Legislation, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 163, 171 (2001). Section 4 of the Bank Holding Act had generally prevented a bank from controlling a non-bank company
without a finding by the Federal Reserve Board of a close relation of the activities of the non-bank company to banking. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 102103; see also Pandozzi, supra, at 171.
12. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act §§ 102-103 (amending section 4(c)(8) of
the Bank Holding Company Act by adding section 4(k) to it). On the complex
relationship of the GLB Act to the typical role of the states in regulating the
insurance industry, see Scott A. Sinder, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and
State Regulation of the Business of Insurance-Past,Present and... Future?,
5 N.C. BANKING INST. 49 (2001).
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By the end of the 1990s, such limitations were widely considered undesirable. 13 The enactment of the GLB Act in 1999
sought to benefit consumers by enhancing competition in the
domestic financial service industries. It also sought to assist
U.S. financial service companies by heightening their ability to
compete internationally. 14 The GLB Act did so by sweeping
away legal restrictions that had prevented mergers among different kinds of financial entities. As one commentator noted,
the GLB Act allows the creation of new financial supermarkets
that are capable of offering "the consumer one-stop financial
shopping."15 This statute permits banks, securities firms, and
insurance companies to combine within a new structure termed
a "financial holding company. 1 6 With enactment of the GLB
Act, a wave of mergers began among different kinds of financial
service entities-a round of far-reaching corporate consolidations that is still underway.
The GLB Act also responds to information privacy issues.
Our initial, process-oriented definition of this term is as follows: Information privacy is the creation and maintenance of
rules that structure and limit access to and use of personal
data.'7 These rules are sometimes found in social norms, such
as the idea of limits on sharing information ("gossip") about one
13. Citigroup provides a good example of the kind of financial entity
blocked by the legal barriers between different kinds of financial entities.
Citigroup was formed by the merger of Citicorp and Travelers Group. As the
Value Line explains, Citigroup "is a diversified financial services company
with operations in consumer and corporate banking, insurance, investment
banking, and asset management." Citigroup, THE VALUE LINE INVESTMENT
SURVEY, 2142 (Nov. 2001). Among Citigroup's businesses are Citibank, Salomon Smith Barney Holdings, CitiFinancial, SSB Citi Asset Management
Group, Primerica Financial Services, Travelers Life & Annuity, and Travelers
Property Casualty. Id. Recently, however, Citigroup has considered a spin-off
of the property-casualty part of its insurance operations. See Paul Beckett,
Citigroup May Split Off a Travelers Unit, Property-CasualtyDivisionAppears
Headed for IPO, PartialSpinoffNext Year, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at A3.
14. David Constantino, Developments in Banking Law: 1999 X. Insurance
and Annuities, 19 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 100, 100 ("After failing to pass a
similar act last year, Congress acknowledged that passing Gramm-LeachBliley was necessary to ensure that the domestic financial services industry
remained competitive with foreign financial services industries."). For a general discussion of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, see Pandozzi, supra note 11, at
170-71.
15. Pandozzi, supra note 11, at 166.
16. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 103 (amending section 4 of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, 12 U.S.C. § 1843).
17. For a discussion of this definition, see PAUL M. SCHWARTZ & JOEL R.
REIDENBERG, DATA PRIVACY LAW 5-6 (1996).
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family member with non-family members. 18 Statutory law,
such as the GLB Act, provides another source for information
privacy rules.
Before the GLB Act, functional barriers between different
companies may have limited some collection and sharing of personal data. In contrast, mergers in the aftermath of the GLB
Act necessarily would lead to creation of new kinds of detailed
stores of personal information. Anticipating this result of the
new financial supermarkets, Congress responded with the
privacy protections of the GLB Act's Title V. As a result of
Title V, the GLB Act was regarded, at least initially, and at
least by some observers, as among the most significant pieces of
privacy legislation of the 1990s. During the debates over the
statute, one Congressman promised that the GLB Act would
"represent the most comprehensive federal privacy protections
ever enacted by Congress." 19 Another congressman stated that
the Act would "provide some of the strongest privacy provisions
to ever be enacted into any federal law."2 0 Despite this initial
enthusiasm, the GLB Act has already managed to disappoint
both industry leaders and privacy advocates alike.
B. THE PRIVACY PROVISIONS OF THE GLB ACT
The GLB Act's privacy provisions have four important aspects. These provisions are briefly stated and then examined in
more detail. First, the GLB Act requires that financial entities
under its regulation provide annual "privacy notices" that inform their customers of their privacy practices. 21 Second, the
GLB Act requires that financial institutions permit consumers
to prevent their personal information from being shared with
non-affiliated companies. 22 The GLB Act does so through an
opt-out requirement. 23 Third, the GLB Act requires financial
24
institutions to develop policies to promote data security.

18.

In contrast to our view, most norm theorists see privacy as merely an

obstacle to norm formation. See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLIcKsON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW 285 (1991) (calling for "improved circulation of accurate reputational information").
19. 145 CONG. REc. H11,544 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep.
Sandlin).
20. Id. H11,539-40 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Vento).
21. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(a).
22. § 502(b).
23. Id.
24.

§ 501(b).
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Fourth, the GLB Act creates a right of enforcement, which it
assigns not to individuals, but to different federal agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller25of
the Currency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.
We begin with the requirement that financial institutions
provide "notice" of their information practices. The notice provision is perhaps the most commented upon of the Act's privacy
requirements, which is unsurprising due to the mandate's high
cost. As an article in the New York Times explained, "Financial
services companies and their supporters... say the notices cost
the companies too much. 2 6 The cost of the privacy notices is
directly tied to the magnitude of the required mailings. A single company, Citigroup, mailed more than ninety million privacy notices to its credit card customers.2 7 The New York
Times also mentioned the likelihood of each United States
household receiving dozens of privacy notices by the initial
GLB Act deadline for notices on July 1, 2001.28
The GLB Act's notice requirements in section 503 subsections (a) and (b) address both the process by which to provide
the notices and their substance or content. The process and
substance requirements both attempt to ensure that the regulated entities provide "clear and conspicuous" disclosure to each
consumer of the institution's policies and practices with regard
to the processing of personal data.29 The idea of notice under
the GLB Act is to convey information that is critical to an
individual's decisionmaking about the use of her personal data.
Thus, section 503(a) requires that privacy notices be provided
to a consumer "[a]t the time of establishing a customer relationship.., and not less than annually during the continuation
of such relationship." 30 As a further mandated process element, entities must provide the notices by mail, in electronic

25. § 505.
26. John Schwartz, Privacy Policy Notices Are Called Too Common and
Too Confusing, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2001, at Al. As a reflection of the overall
frustration with the notice requirement, the FTC held a workshop on December 4, 2001 to allow discussion of problems with the GLB Act privacy notices.
Papers from the workshop are posted at http'//www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
glb/index.html.
27. Schwartz, supra note 26, at Al.
28. Id.
29. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 503(a).
30. Id.
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form, "or other form" as permitted by regulations. 31
Beyond these process elements, the GLB Act also sets out
the required substance of the privacy notices. Section 503(a) of
the GLB Act establishes three initial substantive requirements.
It calls for notices that explain a financial institution's policies
and practices with respect to its (1) disclosure of personal data
to affiliates and nonaffiliated third parties; (2) disclosure of
personal data of persons who have ceased to be its customers;
and (3) protection of personal data of "consumers." 32 The GLB
Act broadly defines the term "consumer."33 Finally, section
503(b) of the GLB Act provides two more elements regarding
the substance of the mandated privacy notices. Privacy notices
must explain a financial institution's policies and practices
with regard to (4) confidentiality "of nonpublic personal information" and (5) categories of personal data collected by the fi34
nancial institution.
If the core of the GLB Act's requirement concerning notice
is that adequate information be provided for individual decisionmaking, the second important aspect of the GLB Act concerns the individual's ability to prevent personal information
from being shared with non-affiliated companies. The GLB Act
protects this interest through an opt-out requirement. 35 As an
initial matter, one must observe that the GLB Act creates no
such individual interest regarding the sharing of personal financial data among affiliated entities. In other words, the GLB
Act creates no ability for consumers to block data sharing inside a financial supermarket. It is for this reason that the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse continues to advise those concerned
31. Id.
32. § 503(a)(1)-(3).
33. The term "consumer' means an individual who obtains, from a financial institution, financial products or services which are to be used primarily
for personal, family, or household purposes, and also means the legal representative of such an individual." § 509(9). The rights of consumers to disclosures regarding the information practices are triggered when a consumer becomes a "customer," § 503(a), and some obligations continue after a "person"
has stopped being a "customer."
34. § 503(b). The form of these notices is to be further specified in regulations issued by the GLB Act oversight agencies. § 503(a). The FTC has already issued its regulations regarding the GLB Act. FTC Privacy of Consumer
Financial Information Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 313 (2001). These regulations
and those of other GLB oversight agencies were upheld against various challenges in Individual Reference Services Group v. FTC, 145 F. Supp. 2d 6, 46
(D. D.C. 2001).
35. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(b).
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maintaining different accounts
about their privacy to consider
36
with different companies.
When information is to be shared outside the financial entity, however, the GLB Act offers more choices to the individual. It requires that customers of the financial entity be informed of this practice and "given the opportunity, before the
time that such information is initially disclosed, to direct that
such information not be disclosed to such third party."37 The
mandated privacy notices discussed above are to inform indinon-affiliates and
viduals both of planned data sharing with
38
their ability to refuse these data transfers.
Thus, the GLB Act sets an opt-out privacy default. Information may be shared with non-affiliates unless consumers, after notice, object to the practice. In contrast, the Clinton Administration backed a financial privacy bill that would have
altered this aspect of the GLB Act for one subset of information.39 The Clinton proposal would have prevented financial
institutions from sharing health information among affiliated
firms or third parties unless consumers explicitly agreed to this
practice. 0 Here, the default would have been set as a privacy
opt-in-information would not be shared with third parties
unless consumers agreed to the practice.
A privacy opt-in does exist, however, for personal financial
information in Vermont. The GLB Act generally allows states
to offer more stringent privacy protections; its standards serve
as a floor, not as a ceiling.4' Vermont is now attempting to
make use of the GLB Act's statutory opening for states. In
36. As the Clearinghouse summarizes: "So, if you are concerned about affiliate sharing and the ability of these 'financial supermarkets' to compile extensive dossiers about you, you must take extra care to conduct your banking
with one corporation, keep your insurance accounts with another unaffiliated
corporation, and your investments with yet another." Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Fact Sheet 24: Protecting Financial Privacy, at http'J/
www.privacyrights.orgfs/fs24-finpriv.htm (Sept. 2001) [hereinafter Fact Sheet
24].
37. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(b)(1)(B).
38. § 502(b).
39. Consumer Financial Privacy Act, H.R. 4380, 106th Cong. (2000). For
details on the Clinton Administration's views regarding financial privacy, see
White House, Proclamation:Plan to Enhance Consumers' FinancialPrivacy,
at http//clinton4.nara.gov/WH/New/html/20000501_4.html (May 1, 2000).
40. H.R. 4380, § 3(b)(2). This bill also required that an opt-out be provided before financial institutions shared data with both affiliated and nonaffiliated parties. § 2(a).
41. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 507(b).
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February 2002, Elizabeth Costle, the Vermont Commissioner of
Banking, Insurance, Securities, and Health Care Administration, issued regulations that require affirmative customer consent before information may be shared with non-affiliated parties.42 These regulations are now under legal attack;43 should
the Vermont approach be upheld in court, it will offer useful
evidence in answering some of the questions regarding the merits of opt-in versus opt-out. We explore this issue in more detail later in this Article.
To return to the GLB Act, beyond its provision allowing
limited individual "choice" through an opt-out requirement, the
Act generally lacks substantive restrictions regarding transfers
of information by a financial institution, whether to affiliated
or non-affiliated companies.M All told then, the success of the
statutory provisions concerning the sharing of personal information with non-affiliated third parties will likely turn on the
effectiveness of (1) privacy notices in actually conveying
information reasonably designed to promote the exercise of
choice and (2) opt-out in actually providing a mechanism
reasonably designed to promote the exercise of choice. We
return to these important points later.
Beyond notice and choice, the third aspect of the GLB Act
requires financial institutions to develop policies to prevent
42. Privacy of Consumer Financial and Health Information Regulation,
VT. CODE R. 21 020 053 Reg. IH-2001-01 (2002). For background on the regulation, see State of Vermont, Dep't of Banking, Ins., Sec. & Health Care Admin., Banking Div., In Wake of Federal Law, Vermont Passes Own Stricter
http'/www.bishca.state.vt.us/
at
Regulations,
Financial
Privacy
news_releases/FinancialPrivacyRegs.htm (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Vermont
Privacy Regulations].
As an international example, Canada has adopted an opt-in regime for
financial information. See Michael Geist, CanadianPrivacy Law's Ins and
Outs, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, April 4, 2002, at B13 ("Financial or health data,
for example, are generally viewed as highly sensitive, and thus require opt-in
available at httpi/
privacy
law]."),
[under Canadian
consent
www.globeandmail.com/servlet/ArticleNews/printarticle/gam/20020404TWGE
ISY.
43. Patrick Thiboudeau, New Vermont 'Opt-in' Privacy Law Faces Legal
http:/www.computerworld.com/storyba/
COMPUTERWORLD,
Challenge,
0,4125,NAV47_ST068104,00.html (Feb. 7, 2002).
44. In one substantive restriction regarding transfers, the GLB Act prevents financial institutions from disclosing an individual's account number or
access code to a non-affiliated company for use in telemarketing, direct mail
marketing, or marketing through e-mail to the consumer. Gramm-LeachBliley Act § 502(d). A financial institution, however, can still disclose personal
data to these parties-the GLB Act prevents it only from disclosing the means
by which one's account can be accessed.
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fraudulent access to confidential financial information. This
aspect of the GLB Act addresses the distinct issues of data security. Data security involves a cluster of concerns, including
the prevention of unauthorized access to personal information
and the processing of only accurate personal information.
The GLB Act spells out three requirements for data security. It calls for financial institutions to (1) protect the security
and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2)
prevent any anticipated threats or hazards to the security or
integrity of such records; and (3) prevent unauthorized access
to use of records that could result in "substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer."45 The question of unauthorized
access to records is further addressed in a section of Title V
concerning "pretexting" or the obtaining of customer information by false pretenses. 46 One way that pretexting occurs is
when false statements are made to an employee of a financial
institution. As Timothy Muris, the Chairman of the FTC, has
explained, "[flor a price, some so-called 'information brokers'
call banks and other financial institutions under the 'pretext' of
being a customer to obtain the customer's account numbers and
balances, as well as other personal information."47 Among the
priorities that Muris has announced as part of the FTC's new
"ambitious, positive, pro-privacy agenda" is an increase in the
48
agency's prosecutions of pretexting.
Finally, the fourth critical aspect of the GLB Act concerns
its assignment of an enforcement right, not to individuals, but
to seven different federal agencies, including the Federal Trade
Commission, Federal Reserve, and Securities and Exchange
Commission. 49 The enforcement powers of these "GLB oversight agencies" include assessing criminal penalties.5 0 In "aggravated cases," the penalties allow doubling of statutory fines
and imprisonment for up to ten years. 51 The GLB Act also
permits the oversight agencies to exercise "for the purpose of
enforcing compliance.., any other authority conferred on such
45. § 501(b)(1)-(3). The Act also requires the GLB Act oversight agencies
to establish "appropriate standards" for data security and integrity. § 501(b).
For a discussion of this provision, see infra Part 1.C.
46. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 521 Subtit. B.
47. Muris, ProtectingPrivacy, supra note 5.

48. Id. Muris has also called for the FTC to increase its resources devoted
to protecting privacy by fifty percent. Id.
49. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 505.

50. § 523.
51. § 523(b).
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agency by law." 52 Thus, the FTC in enforcing the GLB Act can
use its traditional injunctive power and order parties to "cease
and desist" from prohibited behavior. 53 As a final matter regarding enforcement, the FTC and the Attorney General are
required to submit to Congress an annual report on the number
and disposition of any enforcement actions taken pursuant to
the GLB Act.5 4 This requirement will increase the visibility of
enforcement actions carried out by the GLB Act oversight
agencies.
C. UNHAPPINESS WITH THE GLB ACT

The GLB Act has managed to disappoint both industry
leaders and privacy advocates alike. Why are so many observers currently frustrated with the GLB Act? We have already
noted the complaint of financial services companies regarding
the expense of privacy notices. These organizations also argue
that there has been scant pay-off from the costly mailings-and
strong evidence backs up this claim. For example, a survey
from the American Banker's Association found that 22% of
banking customers said that they received a privacy notice but
did not read it, and 41% could not even recall receiving a notice. 55 Another survey found only 0.5% of banking customers
56
had exercised their opt-out rights.
Privacy advocates also have complaints about the GLB Act.
Their objections begin with the lack of comprehensibility of
some of the GLB Act notices. As we have noted, the GLB Act
requires privacy notices and the disclosure of opt-out to be
made "clearly and conspicuously." 57 A readability study of pri52. § 522(b)(2).
53. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(g) (2000). For a
news report on a FTC enforcement action in a different context of privacy, see
Daniel Golden, FTC Investigates Group that Sells Student Data, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 11, 2001, at B1. According to this report, the FTC is now investigating
the National Research Center for College and University Admissions, an organization that helps school recruiters find promising students. Id. This organization also is said to have supplied the names and other personal information of high school students to commercial marketers and made only vague
disclosures to students about how their data would be used. Id.
54. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 526(b).
55. ABA Survey Shows Nearly One Out of Three Consumers Read Their
Banks' Privacy Notices, at http'//www.aba.com/press+ronom/bankfee
060701.htm (June 15, 2001).
56. John Martin, Opting Out--or Not, at http'J/more.abcnews.go.com/
sections/wnt/dailynews/privacy-notices_010621.html (June 21, 2001).
57. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 502(b)(1)(A).
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vacy notices, however, by Mark Hochhauser for the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse, found these notices to be often difficult
to understand. 58 Hochhauser found that, on average, the GLB
Act privacy notices were written at a third or fourth year college reading level. 59 Literacy experts generally recommend
that documents intended for the general public be written at a
junior high school level. 60 As Hochhauser argues, "Consumers
will have a hard time understanding the notices because the
writing style uses too many complicated sentences and too
many uncommon words."6 1 The Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
made a related finding concerning the failings of the GLB Act
notices when it analyzed the consumer contacts it had received
about the Act.6 2 In the judgment of this organization, only
about 10% of the individuals that contacted it for help regarding financial privacy under the GLB Act showed anything ap63
proaching a high level of understanding about privacy notices.
Indeed, most consumers that contacted this organization had
been alerted to privacy protections under the GLB Act by media reports and not by the numerous privacy notices that they
had received.M In many cases, individuals had simply assumed
that these forms were additional telemarketing offers from fi65
nancial institutions and neglected to read the privacy notices.
Not only are privacy notices difficult to understand, but
they are written in a fashion that makes it hard to exercise the
opt-out rights that the GLB Act mandates. For example, optout provisions are sometimes buried in privacy notices. As the
Public Citizen Litigation Group has found, "Explanations of
how to opt out invariably appear at the end of the notices.
Thus, before they learn how to opt out, consumers must trudge
through up to ten pages of fine print... "66 Public Citizen also

58. Mark Hochhauser, Lost in the Fine Print: Readability of Financial
Privacy Notices, at http'/www.privacyrights.org/ar/GLB-Reading.htm (July
2001).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Tena Friery & Beth Givens, 2001: The GLB Odyssey-We're Not There
Yet: How ConsumersResponded to FinancialPrivacy Notices and Recommendationsfor Improving Them, at http//www.privacy rights.org/ar/fp-glb-ftc.htm
(Dec. 4, 2001).

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Public

Citizen

Litigation

Group, Petition for Rulemaking 5,
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identified many passages regarding opt-out that "are obviously
designed to discourage consumers from exercising their rights
under the statute."67 For example, some financial institutions
include an opt-out box only "in a thicket of misleading statements ... "68 Other entities attempt to dissuade consumers by
implying that consumers may have already opted out or that
opting out will accomplish little. A final tactic of the GLB Act
privacy notices is to state that consumers who opt-out may fail
69
to receive "valuable offers."
As Public Citizen concludes regarding the GLB Act privacy
notices, "[i]t seems that these notices were written by lawyers
trained in the art of obfuscation, not by communication experts
trained to express ideas clearly."70 Another explanation is possible: Later in this Article, we argue that the GLB Act notices
can "frame" options, so as to discourage or encourage opting
out. 7 1 We make this argument with reference to the social science literature regarding "framing effects." Specifically, we
suggest that GLB Act notices are currently being designed to
discourage opting out. Before reaching this argument, however, we wish first to consider and refine existing theoretical
work about information sharing and "defaults" (or background
rules) for filling gaps in agreements. In our view, this scholarship can help us understand where the GLB Act went wrongand how it might be set right.
II. INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND NORM ENFORCING
DEFAULTS
The GLB Act provides default terms for the use of personal
data by financial institutions. By "default terms," we mean the
background rules that govern an agreement unless individual
action is taken to customize the terms. As Ian Ayres and
Robert Gertner explain, "[d]efault rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts; they govern unless the parties contract around
them."72 In this Part, we begin by looking at three characterishttp://www.epic.org/privacy/consumer/glbpetition.pdf (July 26, 2001).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 5-6.
70. Id. at 4.
71. See infra Part II.A.
72. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts:An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) [hereinafter
Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Majori-
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tics of default rules. We present these aspects of default rules
as distinct, ideal types, although in practice a default rule may
have more or less of these different characteristics. In our
view, default rules can be majoritarian, information forcing,
73
and norm enforcing.
Afier defining and exploring each of these default rules in
Section A below, we conclude that the GLB Act does not create
successful majoritarian or information forcing defaults. As for
norm enforcing defaults, the extent to which a background rule
actually encourages certain behavior can only be evaluated
once an underlying normative function is specified. What then
should be the normative role of an information privacy law,
such as the GLB Act's Title V? We turn to this question in section B of this Part. Finally, Section C concludes by proposing
possible improvements to existing mandatory opt-out default
rules in the GLB Act.
A. MAJORITARIAN DEFAULTS, INFORMATION FORCING
DEFAULTS AND BEHAVIOR FORCING DEFAULTS

This section examines the law of incomplete contracts.
This area of law is of particular interest to us because prior to
the GLB Act parties involved in most consumer relationships
with financial institutions did not explicitly negotiate regarding
information privacy. Where gaps might once have existed, the
GLB Act has now spoken and provided rules for information
privacy. The question remains, however, as to the nature of its
gap closing terms.
The law of incomplete contracts recognizes that parties to a
broad range of ordinary commercial transactions cannot be expected to specify the terms of their agreement in full and comtarian vs. MinoritarianDefaults, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1591 (1999); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice of
Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992).
73. On majoritarian default terms, see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps,supra note 72, at 89 ("Few academics have gone beyond one-sentence theories
stipulating that default terms should be set at what the parties would have
wanted."). Regarding information forcing defaults, Ayres and Gertner state
that these defaults
are designed to give at least one party to the contract an incentive to
contract around the default rule and therefore to choose affirmatively
the contract provision they prefer. In contrast to the received wisdom, penalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would
not want-in order to encourage the parties to reveal information to
each other or to third parties (especially the courts).
Id. at 91. The term "norm enforcing default" is our own.
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plete fashion. 74 When a consumer purchases a candy bar from
a convenience store, for example, the law does not expect her to
bargain with the seller over contingencies such as her unexpected dislike for the brand of candy or the chocolate turning
out to be an inedible lump. Indeed, the law accepts that parties
will not be foresighted even in complex contracting arrangements among sophisticated parties. 75 Try as they might, even
74. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, FraudulentConveyance Law
and Its ProperDomain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829, 835-36 (1985) ("[Default rules]
should provide all the parties with the type of contract that they would have
agreed to if they had had the time and money to bargain over all aspects of
their deal."); see also Charles J. Goetz & Robert Scott, The MitigationPrinciple: Toward a General Theory of ContractualObligation, 69 VA. L. REV. 967,
971 (1983) ("Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by the state should
mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to
bargain out each detail of the transaction.").
75. The law of sales provides off the shelf warranties. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313
(1989) (express warranties), 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability), 2315 (implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose). The law of sales
also provides for remedies that determine, for example, what will happen if
the chocolate proves inedible. See U.C.C. § 2-714 (1989). Note that even for
sophisticated parties single transactions involving small sums of money may
not merit the expense of generating a fully specified agreement. Moreover,
sophisticated parties may recognize that limitations on foresight may lead
them to use open-ended defaults to align incentives ex post. See, e.g., Gillian
Y, Hadfield, Judicial Comptence and the Interpretationof Incomplete Contracts,23 J. LEGAL STUD. 159, 166 (1994).
One context where the debate about the capacity of parties to specify obligations ex ante has been hotly contested is in the literature on "contract bankruptcy." One group of scholars argues that bankruptcy law should be treated
as a waivable default term. See Barry E. Adler, Financialand PoliticalTheories of American CorporateBankruptcy, 45 STAN. L. REV. 311, 313-14 (1993)
("Bankruptcy's solution to the common pool problem, however, rests on a
faulty premise: that there is a common pool problem.... In theory, each creditor could appoint management as its agent to enforce a mutual and irrevocable
agreement among creditors to accept only a collective default remedy."); Barry
E. Adler, A World Without Debt, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 811, 816-18 (1994) ("[11n
principle, a world without debt or bankruptcy, and with contractual solutions
to the collective action problem, seems an efficient world."); Michael Bradley &
Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for Chapter11, 101 YALE L.J. 1043,
1078-79 (1992) ("Chapter 11 should be repealed, abolishing court-supervised
corporate reorganizations and, in effect, precluding residual claimants from
participating in any reorganization of the firm."); Robert K. Rasmussen,
Debtor's Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEx. L. REV.
51, 53-54 (1992) ("Contrary to the prevailing wisdom, this Article argues that
bankruptcy law should be treated as a default rule."); Alan Schwartz, Bankruptcy ContractingReviewed, 109 YALE L.J. 343, 363 (1999) (arguing that
bankruptcy law should be the default rule); Alan Schwartz, A Contract Theory
Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1821-22 (1998) (advocating the ex ante perspective).
Other scholars argue that Bankruptcy Code protection should be non-
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sophisticated individuals will not be able to draft contractual
terms that cover every possible eventuality. Indeed, the economics of many transactions make customized bargaining inefficient. For example, the consumer buying the candy bar is rationally more likely to opt for the shortest possible waiting time
before her chocolate experience rather than negotiating an explicit agreement concerning all aspects of the sale in question.
It may be efficient to not spend any time on the terms of con76
tracts concerning a wide variety of matters.
waivable. See Susan Block-Lieb, The Logic and Limits of Contract Bankruptcy, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 503, 508 (2001); Lynn M. LoPucki, ContractBankruptcy: A Reply to Alan Schwartz, 109 YALE L.J. 317, 342 (1999). It is striking, however, that scholars on both sides of the debate agree that federal
bankruptcy law should remain available as a default where the parties choose
not to generate a customized insolvency regime.
76. Contract scholars have noted that one of the benefits of standardized
contracts is to provide so-called "network externalities." Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardizationand Innovation in Corporate Contracting(or
"The Economics of Boilerplate"), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 760 (1997); Michael
Klausner, Corporations,CorporateLaw, and Networks of Contracts,81 VA. L.
REV. 757, 763-64 (1995). Network externalities arise when one contracting
party invests time and effort into figuring out how to accomplish a complex
transaction. Once a set of forms exists, the second deal is much less costly to
do than the first. The first deal will have a positive external effect by reducing
the cost of doing similar deals for all subsequent parties. To the extent that
the first party is a repeat player, it may capture some of the benefit, but the
benefit also extends to other members of the contracting network.
Edward Rubin recognizes that contractual default rules can provide the
same network externality as that provided by form contracts. See Edward L.
Rubin, Types of Contracts, Interventions of Law, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1903,
1919-20 (2000) ("[The optimal level of standardization for adaptable contracts
might not be produced by the market, and that legal intervention might secure
the use of standard forms more reliably than the market does.").
Duncan Kennedy takes a different approach to explaining consumers'
failure to engage in scrutiny of standardized contracts. He writes,
[C]onsumers have only limited knowledge of the probabilities that
apply to them at the time of making the contract. There are many
other unexpected disasters that might also afflict them, and they may
rationally decide that spending even a little time on the terms of legal
protection from each would be a waste of effort. Assume that buyers
also suspect that sellers in general tend to lie about the contract
terms they offer, and that even when they have legally assumed an
obligation to buyers, they tend to resist honoring it if it falls due, so
that the consumer may have to pay more in legal fees than the value
of the injury if he wants to enforce a contract clause covering anything less than a major catastrophe.
Duncan Kennedy, Distributive and PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort
Law with Special Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal Bargaining
Power, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 599-601 (1982). In Kennedy's view, it will be rational for consumers simply to ignore contractual terms. Id. at 603. As a result, Kennedy ends with the same view as those who argue in favor of "net-

1236

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol.86:1219

Fortunately, contractual default rules come to the rescue
where parties to a contract fail to specify a term.77 Contract
law scholarship speaks of both majoritarian defaults and information forcing defaults. Later in this Article, we develop the
concept of a "norm enforcing" default, but we begin with these
two other terms. A majoritariandefault seeks to approximate
the term most parties would have agreed to had they taken the
time to bargain. Majoritarian default rules are quite common
in commercial law. When Karl Llewellyn drafted the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.), he expressly sought to adopt defaults that ratified existing commercial practice. 78 Indeed, the
U.C.C. expressly provides for majoritarian defaults in section 1205, which requires courts to fill gaps in the express terms of
contracts by drawing on course of performance, course of dealing, and usage of trade. Perhaps more importantly, U.C.C. section 2-208 requires courts to use commercial practice to explicate express terms of contracts should they prove ambiguous.
These sections of the U.C.C. put courts squarely in the role of
interpreting contracts in terms of the hypothetical majoritarian
79
bargain whenever gaps or ambiguities appear.
To identify the GLB Act as drawing on majoritarian defaults, one might attempt to demonstrate that most individuals
work externalities": It can be desirable for the law to provide compulsory
terms for contracts. Id. at 597.
77. Cf Rubin, supra note 76, at 1914-16.
78. Robert E. Scott, Is Article 2 the Best We Can Do?, 52 HASTINGS L.J.
677, 685 n.26 (2001) ("Llewellyn believed that a major purpose of the Code was
to resolve disputes according to the 'best' commercial norms. In his view, the
task of the courts was to identify and select the best commercial prototypes
that were revealed in a particular commercial environment.").
79. This so-called "incorporation strategy" has been the subject of heated
debate among commercial scholars. Compare Jody S. Kraus & Steven D.
Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE JURISPRUDENTIAL
FOuNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193, 193 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2000), with Robert E. Scott, The Case for Formalismin Relational
Contract,94 Nw. U. L. REV. 847, 871-74 (2000), and Lisa Bernstein, The Questionable Empirical Basis of Article 2"s IncorporationStrategy: A Preliminary
Study, 66 U. Cm1. L. REV. 710, 714-15 (1999). Bernstein notes,
The debates surrounding these codification efforts suggest that there
was not widespread agreement among merchants as to either the
meaning of common terms of trade or the content of many basic commercial practices. Rules committee debates sometimes went on for
years, customs relating to important aspects of transactions were left
uncodified because consensus could not be achieved, and in most industries drafting committees eventually engaged in only selective
codification.
Id. at 714-15.
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would in fact bargain for its terms. This approach to majoritarian defaults views the topic as an empirical matter. Either
most consumers would want the default terms of the GLB Act,
or they would not. This path requires answering questions regarding whether most individuals desire (1) privacy notices; (2)
an opt-out obligation before data sharing with non-affiliated
parties; (3) an inability to block data sharing with affiliated entities; or (4) an absence of any private right of action should
their interests be violated.
As a further twist, we should also point out that the requirement of sending privacy notices under the GLB Act is not,
strictly speaking, a "default" in the terminology of the law of
incomplete contracts. Rather, the GLB Act creates an "immutable" rule for privacy notices-a mandatory obligation that the
parties cannot change. 80 Customers of a financial institution
are to be supplied with privacy notices on a yearly basis; the
customers and the financial entity cannot negotiate around this
requirement.8 1 Although it cannot be changed, this immutable
rule might still reach a majoritarian result. So, once again, we
might decide to approach this matter as a simple empirical
question.
A flight to empiricism is not unproblematic. In drafting
the GLB Act, Congress does not appear to have engaged in empirical research or drawn upon an outside body of findings regarding majoritarian wishes.8 2 Additionally, the GLB Act,
whether through its defaults or its mandatory rules, does not
appear to have reached de facto majoritarian results. One can
plausibly argue, for example, that most customers, at least as
the privacy market is currently constituted, (1) would not demand privacy notices; (2) would want an opt-in, or affirmative
consent, before data sharing among non-affiliates; (3) would
80. See generally Ayres & Gertner, FillingGaps, supra note 72, at 88 (discussing the origins and basis for immutable rules); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Mandatory/EnablingBalance in Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial
Role, 89 COLUm. L. REV. 1618, 1624 (1989) (discussing mandatory fiduciary
duties); Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89

COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1555-85 (1989) (describing the role that mandatory
rules play in a contractual system).
81. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 502, 113 Stat.
1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.). For the FTC's
rule regarding § 502 of the GLB Act, see FTC Privacy of Consumer Financial

Information Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 313.5(a)(1) (2001).
82. FinancialPrivacy: Hearingson H.R. 10 the FinancialServices Act of
1999, Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit, Comm. on
Banking and Fin. Serv., H.R. 106-32, 106th Cong. (1999).
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want to be able to block data sharing even among affiliated entities; and (4) would want to have a private right of action
against financial entities for violation of their privacy interests.8 3 The GLB Act supplies the first rule (which consumers
arguably do not want) and does not reach the second, third, or
fourth outcomes (which consumers arguably desire). These results appear counter-majoritarian.
The presence or absence of majoritarian defaults in the
GLB Act may therefore seem to turn on a simple issue-does
the GLB Act reflect majoritarian desires? At this point, we
wish to refine this question and our analysis because majority
wishes regarding contractual defaults (or mandatory contractual elements) can be quite intractable. Empiricism is, as it
turns out, an elusive matter when it comes to contractual majoritarianism.
As Richard Craswell has persuasively argued, majoritarian
defaults are difficult to derive from empirical data.8 4 Craswell
has identified a number of "difficulties involved in interpreting
the sociological data about a society's practices."85 He has
pointed to issues regarding "the number of people who must follow any set of rules for those rules to be accepted as a legally
relevant practice"; "the problem of conflicting expectations at
different levels of generality"; and "the potential for circularity
that arises when people's expectations are themselves affected
by existing legal rules."8 6 The last point is of particular impor83. The polling data is incomplete, but suggestive. Thus, the newsletter
Privacy Times has reported on a survey that found 57% of respondents "very"
or "somewhat" concerned that their "primary financial institution" was sharing "their personal or financial data with its partners or third parties." NotSo-PrivateBanking, Privacy Times, Jan. 7, 2002, at 3. The survey was sponsored by Star Systems, Inc., an ATM company. More specifically, the poll
found an even higher percentage (62%) concerned that their financial institution was sharing information with "affiliated companies." Id. at 3-4. This percentage of concerned consumers even exceeded those who were concerned
about data sharing with "government agencies" (59%). Id.
Another survey focused solely on Californians. This survey, sponsored by
E-Loan, an online lender, "found that 66% of respondents favored an opt-in
[approach to financial privacy] bill, 8% favored opt-out, 13% preferred neither
and 6% didn't know." 22 Privacy Times, Poll: Californians Want Speier Bill,
Feb. 27, 2002, at 6. In addition, 80% of respondents said that they were "not
at all comfortable" with financial institutions selling their data to other financial firms. Id. at 7.
84. Richard Craswell, ContractLaw, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of
Promising,88 MICH. L. REV. 489, 505-08 (1989).
85. Id. at 506.
86. Id. at 506-07.
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tance in the area of information privacy. Prior to the GLB Act,
individual financial privacy expectations, to the extent that
they were at all formed, could only be based on existing law, including judicial decisions, and the practices imposed upon consumers by financial institutions. The circularity that Craswell
warns about arises if these expectations are used to set majoritarian defaults.
A second approach to contract defaults is the idea of information forcing defaults. These are also known as "penalty defaults" for reasons that will become evident shortly. As developed by Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner, such defaults are to be a
helpful response to information asymmetries. The idea is to
"inform the relatively uninformed contracting party" by setting
87
a penalty as a default against the better informed party.
Through this penalizing effect, information forcing defaults are
intended to obligate the party with better information to disclose it and thereby encourage parties to bargain about the
terms. These default rules are by definition non-majoritarian;
it is expected that parties will frequently, if not inevitably, alter
the default. The key is that the information default disfavors
the party with better information.
As an example of an information forcing default, Ayres and
Gertner point to the treatment of real estate brokerage commissions for a buyer breaching a purchase contract.88 The applicable contracts typically include a clause obligating the purchaser to forfeit a specific amount of "earnest" money if she
breaches the agreement. If the contract is silent on how to divide this money between the real estate broker and the seller,
Ayres and Gertner propose that the default rule be set in favor
of the uninformed party, who is likely to be the seller. As a result, in the case of buyer breach, the earnest money should go
to the seller, not the real estate broker. This default rule prevents the broker from taking advantage of a seller's ignorance
by setting the information forcing default as a penalty for the
better informed party. Ayres and Gertner conclude that "[tlhe
real estate broker will more likely be informed about the default rule than the seller. Indeed, the seller may not even consider the issue of how to split the earnest money in case of default."89

87. Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps,supra note 72, at 98.
88. Id. at 98-99.
89. Id. at 99.
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Before we return to the GLB Act, we wish to consider a fur90
ther information problem, that of the "lemons equilibrium."
Problems with information can be systematic enough to skew
an entire class of negotiations-a lesson already found in the
previous example involving the earnest money and real estate
broker. A lemons equilibrium occurs when one party has good
information about price but bad information about non-price
terms. For example, the seller of real estate may understand
the commission that a broker receives but comprehend little
about who receives earnest money following a purchaser's
breach. As another example, lemons equilibria typically occur
with used automobiles, where buyers face high transaction
costs in gathering information about the most critical non-price
information: whether the car is in good condition. 9'
The danger is that these information asymmetries will become entrenched. Richard Craswell explains the difficulty in
overcoming a lemons equilibrium as follows:
Because terms that are good for buyers are generally more expensive
for sellers, any seller that offers better terms will charge a higher
price to make the same level of profits she could make by offering less
favorable terms at a lower price. However, if most buyers have good
information about prices but only poor information about non-price
terms, they may not notice an improvement in non-price terms, while
they will definitely notice the higher price. As a result, many buyers
may stop purchasing from this seller92

Once a sufficiently large number of buyers cease purchasing, the seller will lose money as a result of her decision to offer
more favorable terms at a higher price. Craswell concludes, "In
that case, no seller has an incentive to offer the more favorable
terms, and the result is an equilibrium in which only bad contract terms (or "lemons") can be obtained."93 Craswell's parenthetical allusion to lemons suggests an unfortunate consequence when buyers and sellers are unable to signal the
presence of a good product. In a lemons equilibrium, either bad
90. See, e.g., George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-90 (1970); Michael
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions,ProductFailure and ProducerLiability, 44
REV. ECON. STUD. 561, 561 (1977).

91. As Cooter and Ulen state, "Mtis often the case that sellers know more
about the quality of goods than do buyers. For example, a person who offers
his car for sale knows far more about its quirks than does a potential buyer."
ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 41 (2d ed. 1997).
92. Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability and Related Doctrines,60 U. CmI. L. REV. 1, 49 (1993).

93. Id.
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products ("lemons")
are offered for sale or bad contract terms
94
are presented.
To return to the GLB Act, does this statute successfully respond to information asymmetries, as Ayres and Gertner suggest, or to a lemons equilibrium in the privacy market? Interestingly, the GLB Act does have information forcing elements.
It requires financial entities, the party with superior knowledge
about the value of personal information and how it will be used,
to mail privacy notices and to give individuals an opportunity
to opt-out before their personal data can be shared with nonaffiliated entities. Thus, the GLB Act obligates the relatively
better informed parties (financial institutions) to share information with the other parties. While the GLB Act requires disclosure of information, it does not penalize the better informed
parties and thereby is unlikely to encourage bargaining.
The GLB Act merely contains an opt-out requirement. As
a result, information can be disclosed to non-affiliated entities
unless individuals take affirmative action, namely, informing
the financial entity that they refuse to share their personal
data. By setting its default as an opt-out, the GLB Act fails to
create any penalty on the party with superior knowledge, here
the financial entity, should negotiations fail to occur. In other
words, the GLB Act leaves the burden of bargaining on the less
informed party, the individual consumer. These doubts about
the efficacy of opt-out are supported, at least indirectly, by the
evidence concerning sometimes confusing and sometimes misleading privacy notices.95 An opt-out default creates incentives
for privacy notices that lead to inaction by the consumer.
What then of a lemons equilibrium in the privacy market
with financial institutions? In financial transactions, the consumer generally does have good information about price (such
as the cost of a checking account) but bad information about
non-price terms (such as the rules for information privacy).
These are fertile conditions for a lemons equilibrium. Further,
the current privacy market does not appear to have led financial entities to compete in offering better privacy terms. Finally, consumers today certainly would be hard pressed, amidst
the clutter of confusing privacy notices, to observe any improvement in non-price terms involving personal data use. In
94. Information forcing defaults, if imposed on a class-wide basis, are intended to force a group of sellers to disclose information about non-price
terms.
95. See supra Part I.
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part, there seem to be major coordination problems among individuals--"[a]s members of large consumer blocks, individuals
may have difficulty finding effective ways to express collectively their relative preferences for privacy."96 Moreover, competition may not arise among financial service companies regarding finding more effective means to satisfy consumer
preferences for privacy. A lemons equilibrium appears to exist
between financial institutions and consumers.
Thus far, we have argued that the information forcing aspects of the GLB Act have proven insufficient to help the less
informed party, the individual consumer, bargain for better
privacy. As a final matter, we wish to note a more general difficulty with information forcing mechanisms, such as found in
the GLB Act, as a means for overcoming knowledge asymmetries in a privacy market. The problem is simply stated: More
information alone may fail to induce consumers to bargain for
information privacy. In making this point, we wish to draw on
findings by social scientists that point to the limited, or
"bounded," nature of consumer rationality. In particular, these
findings reveal that the parties who shape the form of offers
have strong power over subsequent decisionmaking by consumers.
This power flows from the "framing effect" on decisionmaking. 97 A "framing effect" refers to the manner in which the
presentation of options influences choice. 98 As Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky summarize, these "[flormulation effects
can occur fortuitously, without anyone being aware of the impact of the frame on the ultimate decision. They can also be
exploited deliberately to manipulate the relative attractiveness
of options." 99 Since financial institutions draft the GLB Act
96. Schwartz, Privacy Economics, supra note 6, at 50-51. For a discussion
of similar coordination problems in the context of health care privacy, see id.
97. A framing effect occurs when "the very same choice can be perceived
as a gain or a loss based purely on its formal presentation." Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspective on Pain and Suffering
Awards, in BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMIcs 259, 262 (Cass R. Sunstein ed.,
2000). As an example, "individuals will perceive a penalty for using credit
cards as a loss and a bonus for using cash as a gain; this will lead individuals
to use cash if and only if the 'penalty' tack is taken, although the two situations are, from an economic and end-state perspective, identical." Id.
98. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Advances in Prospect Theory:
Cumulative Representationof Uncertainty, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES

44-45 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000).
99. Daniel Katneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 1, 10 (Daniel Kaneman & Amos Tversky
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statements, and thereby set the frames, they have considerable
power to influence consumer decision-making. How might
framing effects take place through the GLB Act notices?
According to well documented empirical findings, most
people define value by focusing on changes (gains and losses)
relative to some reference point. Research into frames has also
found that most people react more decisively to avoid losses
than to obtain gains. Put simply, the pain caused by the loss of
$100 is greater than the joy caused by the gain of $100.100 Reconsider, then, the privacy notices that imply that consumers
may have already opted out or that opting out will accomplish
little. These GLB Act notices present a reference point that
suggests to consumers that only inaction is needed or that at
best only relatively small gains are available from opting out.
Finally, to raise an additional tactic of the GLB Act privacy notices, some notices state that consumers who opt-out may fail to
receive "valuable offers." This notice creates a frame that
points to opting out as leading only to a loss. By creating a perceived entitlement, the financial institution seeks to discourage
opt-out. Due to the power of frames, a "notice plus opt-out" approach may prove unable to alter a lemons equilibrium and
have virtually no information forcing effect. 10 1 To express this
idea more completely, a law requiring notice and an opt-out default may fail to induce much bargaining so long as the better
informed party still controls the language and form in which
the actual data are conveyed.
In light of this critique, a notice and "opt-in" regime might
at first appear to be a better choice to create an information
forcing default. Because consent must be procured, the burden
eds., 2000).
100. Kabneman, Knetsch, and Thaler report,
A wine-loving economist we know purchased some nice Bordeaux
wines years ago at low prices. The wines have greatly appreciated in
value .... This economist now drinks some of this wine occasionally,
but would neither be willing to sell the wine at the auction price nor
buy an additional bottle at that price.
Thaler called this pattern-the fact that people often demand
much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to
acquire it-the endowment effect.
Daniel Kalneman et al., The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, And Status
Quo Bias, in CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAmES 159 (Daniel Kahneman & Amos
Tversky eds., 2000).
101. See, e.g., Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in ContractNegotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 1583, 1587-92 (1998).
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shifts to the financial institution to convince a customer to
permit disclosure. The financial organization must therefore
explain the benefits of action, which has the effect of flipping
the frame. Opt-in creates an entitlement in the privacy of personal information, and the customer must be induced to give it
up. In explaining the move to an opt-in standard for financial
privacy in Vermont, the Banking Commissioner made precisely
such an argument in favor of flipping the frame. Elizabeth
Costle stated that "[i]nstead of waiving their right to privacy by
inaction, Vermonters will be protected until they knowingly
agree to the sharing of their personal information."" 2 Viewed
from an information forcing perspective, opt-in would appear to
be an improvement over opt-out. It is, nevertheless, subject to
various criticisms, some contradictory, which we wish to discuss.
First, consider the majoritarian perspective on the move to
an opt-in. If most people will choose disclosure, then opt-in increases the cost of getting people where they want to go anyway. Worse yet, because of the flipping of the frame, many
people will not opt-in, when perhaps many people would have
wanted to do so. Here is a possible criticism that we wish to
point out but not adopt. Once again, majoritarianism oversimplifies the complexity involved in setting defaults. On a different note, we will, however, argue below that the goal of opt-in
may not give people precisely what they want in each transaction. Attention is also needed to the creation and preservation
of a privacy commons. If we seek to create more general rules,
termed "Fair Information Practices," for use of personal data,
opt-in and private negotiations may not be of much help.
Second, and more troubling, financial institutions are
likely to be good at getting consent when they need it. After
all, they provide services that most people need or, at least, desire greatly. When faced with a choice between opting-in and
not getting a credit card, the customer will likely choose to optin. This criticism points to the power of the stronger party to
use contracts of adhesion. This point has some merit; the adjustment of frames can have an impact upon consumer choice,
but decisionmaking also faces other powerful constraints. Even
if the better informed party does not entirely control the language and form in which the actual information about terms is
conveyed, defaults may prove unable to induce much bargain102. Vermont Privacy Regulations,supra note 42.
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ing about critical issues.
To point to a recognition of the limits of information forcing
defaults, used car "lemon laws" typically do not rely exclusively
on an information forcing approach. These statutes provide
some information forcing through standardized language in
warranties, but also typically require, among their most important protections, that used car dealers provide a written, minimum guarantee of the used automobile for a short period of
time (such as the earlier of thirty days or 1000 miles if the vehicle has 36,000 miles at the time of sale). 10 3 These laws also
generally require that commercial used car sellers take such
vehicles back from the buyer when the flaws persist after several attempts at repair. 10 4 Sometimes better information may
not be enough to overcome market failure.
Thus far, we have discussed majoritarian and information
forcing defaults. In our view, these two approaches to evaluating background rules are not the best approaches for information privacy. We now wish to set out a third classification of
background rules, that of "norm enforcing" defaults.
A norm enforcing default seeks to alter, or channel, behavior of parties through reference to a non-contractual norm or
policy. Rather than identifying a majoritarian position or an
information forcing effect, a norm enforcing default is justified
by explicit recourse to some substantive value. To be sure, once
we leave the realm of ideal types, other kinds of defaults can
have norm enforcing aspects. Both majoritarian and information forcing defaults, at times, have been justified because of
some normative goal that they are said to reach. 0 5 As a sepa103. For an introduction to these laws, see Martha M. Post, New York's
Used-CarLemon Law: An Evaluation,35 BUFF. L. REV. 971 (1986). The law

itself is found at N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 198(a) (1988).
104. These statutes also provide for strong rights for the consumer when a
dealer fails to fulfill his legal obligations. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 198b(c)(2) (1988).
105. Some scholars have justified the use of majoritarian defaults on utilitarian grounds; these defaults are said to minimize the costs of contracting by
reaching a result that most parties would desire without the parties actually
having to invest in drafting the rule. Majoritarian defaults have also been defended as reflecting the parties' hypothetical consent. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698,

702 (1982) (noting that fiduciary duties reflect the contract that shareholders
would have negotiated with managers); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The ProperRole of a Target'sManagement in Responding to a Tender

Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1182 (1981) (explaining that corporate defaults
supply "standard form 'contracts' of the sort shareholders would be likely to
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rate category, however, the value of the norm enforcing default
is that it makes explicit this characteristic of background rules.
Norm enforcing defaults matter10because
of the impact that they
6
have on norm-related behavior.
We now face a puzzle that this Article has thus far avoided:
What should be the normative role of information privacy law?
Evaluating the GLB Act in terms of norm enforcing defaults
requires an answer to this question. As a further complexity,
and as we argae in the next section, different background rules
for sharing personal data will promote different normative
agendas for information privacy law.
B. TOWARD A NORMATIVE ROLE FOR INFORMATION PRIVACYTHE VIEW BEYOND DEFAULTS

Thus far, this Article has defined information privacy as
involving the creation and maintenance of rules that structure
choose."). From this perspective, termed the "contractualist justification," a
majoritarian default rule is worthwhile because it is based on what most parties would have agreed to under some greater or lesser idealized setting. For a
more general introduction to the contractualist approach, see David Charny,
HypotheticalBargains:The Normative Structure of ContractInterpretation,89
MICH. L. REV. 1815 (1991); Jules L. Coleman et al., A BargainingTheory Approach to Default Provisionsand Disclosure Rules in ContractLaw, 12 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POLY. 639, 645-47 (1989). We can also imagine information forcing default rules that are grounded in norm enforcement; thus, information
forcing may be said to overcome coordination problems to reach an economically efficient result.
106. Richard Craswell has been the most important influence on us in positing our category of "norm enforcing" defaults for privacy. He has written of
the failure of "content-neutral" theories of default rules in these terms:
["Content neutral" default theories] give reasons why an individual
who has promised to do 0 thereby incurs some form of obligation to do
0, regardless of how 0 is filled in. The reason for this neutrality is
understandable: To do anything more requires a theory that would
tell people what kinds of promises they ought to make. Unfortunately,
the theorists' reluctance to advise individuals as to how they ought to
exercise their freedom to fill in the content of 0 leaves them equally
unable to give legal systems any guidance about how to fill in the content of 0 when contracting parties fail to specify their preferred content.
This other theory must be a theory that is not neutral between
the different ways of filling in the exact scope of the parties' obligation-for example, it must provide some reason for preferring promises with an implied warranty to promises without an implied warranty, or vice versa. In other words, this other theory must rely on
more than the value of individual autonomy or the value of telling the
truth.
Craswell, supra note 84, at 515-16. In the next section of this Article, we attempt to develop just a theory under the title of"constitutive privacy."
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access to and use of personal data. This definition is processoriented; we wish now to examine the issue of information privacy's normative purpose. In this section, we draw contrasts
between two normative views of privacy and relate these visions back to the question of default rules. The first view of privacy is concerned with individual control over personal data
("privacy-control"). The second normative vision of information privacy considers it as a value constitutive of society
("constitutive privacy").
Privacy-control. The leading paradigm of information privacy conceives of it as a right to control the use of one's data.
As the Supreme Court declared in a leading Freedom of Information Act opinion, "[Bloth the common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the individual's control of
information concerning his or her person."107 Leading scholarship for almost a half-century contains similar definitions of information privacy.10 8 The paradigm of privacy-control is a liberal autonomy principle that seeks to place the individual at
the center of decisionmaking about personal information use.
It seeks to achieve informational autonomy through individual
stewardship of personal data and individual bargaining about
data use.
Autonomy fits within the model of "privacy-control" in two
ways. First, as Robert Post notes, "[alutonomy refers to the
ability of persons to create their own identity and in this way to
define themselves." 10 9 By allowing individual stewardship of
personal information, privacy-control helps people control their
own identity. It does so in particular by limiting and shaping

107. United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporter's Comm., 489 U.S. 749, 763
(1988).
108. See Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482-83 (1968) ('Privacy
is not simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others; rather
it is the control we have over information about ourselves."); Ken Gormley,
One Hundred Years of Privacy, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1335, 1356 ("[Clontrol of information about oneself is critical in determining how and when (if ever) others will perceive us, which is in turn essential to maintaining our individual
personalities."); Richard A. Posner, Privacy, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMIICS 103, 104 (Peter Newman ed., Stockton Press 1998) ("[E]conomic
analysis of the law of privacy.., should focus on those aspects of privacy law
that are concerned with the control by individuals of the dissemination of information about themselves."); Frederick Schauer, Internet Privacy and the
Public-PrivateDistinction,38 JUMIETRICS J. 555, 556 (1998) ("The privacy
interest I address here is the power to control the facts about one's life.").
109. Robert C. Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2092
(2001).
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the personal information that others have about us and thereby
influencing the views that they have of us. Richard Posner's
skepticism about information privacy flows precisely from this
aspect of it. In his view, information privacy is mostly a bad
thing relating to a "right to conceal discrediting information." 10
Second, autonomy also means making decisions about personal matters, especially ones that are important to selfdefinition. Thus, one's decisionmaking about important health
care choices is said to promote individual autonomy."' Privacy-control seeks to promote autonomy by heightening individual choice about the use of personal data, including negotiating agreements about data use.
Privacy-control also encourages a commodification
(through bright-line propertization and contractualization) of
personal information. In the current information age, personal
information is frequently considered as a new kind of intellectual property. Once it takes this form, as Pamela Samuelson
has noted, individuals are "to bargain over which personal data
to reveal to which firms for what purposes." 1 2 The transformation of personal information into property allows people to bargain over it and make binding transfers of it through contracts.
In this fashion, the paradigm of privacy-control links autonomy, property, and contract.
At this point, we can also see that privacy-control fits in
comfortably with the use of both majoritarian and information
forcing defaults. A majoritarian default is set as the term that
most parties would have reached had they bargained. Recourse
to this default can be said to promote choice, or, at a minimum,
implied consent. After all, a given course of consumer inaction
at best signals acquiescence and, in that sense, implied con-

110. Posner, supra note 108, at 105 ("Legal protection of the right to conceal discrediting information is problematic for the further reason that it undermines social control by means of norms, an important substitute for legal
control of behaviour [sic].").
111. For a discussion of informed consent in the health care setting, see
CARL E. SCHNEIDER, THE PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY: PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND

MEDICAL DECISIONS 87-92 (1998); Joseph Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell:
Some Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent and the
Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L.J. 683, 690-94 (1975); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking
Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 902-04 (1994); Aaron D. Twerski & Neff
B. Cohen, The Second Revolution in Informed Consent, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 25 (1999).
112. Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as IntellectualProperty?, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1127-30 (2000).
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sent.1 1 3 Once a default is set in a majoritarian fashion, and individuals do nothing to change the default, one may assume
that agreement has been reached. As for the information forcing default, the second kind of background rule, it is also highly
compatible with the paradigm of privacy-control. To explore
the terms of this compatibility, we first wish to adjust the actual terms of the GLB Act and then to sketch a "rosy scenario"
of the impact of the revised statute.
Imagine a revised GLB Act with an opt-in requirement for
data sharing with non-affiliates. The revised statute would
now contain a true information forcing default due to its penalty-unless the financial institution obtained affirmative consent from the individual, it could not share information with a
non-affiliated entity.1 1 4 Such a result is, in fact, reached under
Vermont's recent financial privacy regulations. Under the revised GLB Act or Vermont law, moreover, the following "rosy
scenario" might occur: The financial institution will now have
to do more to obtain assent from the individual before data
sharing may occur. It would be obliged to provide more privacy, more financial services at the same price, or a lower price
for the same level of services. Individual choice about data use
would therefore be heightened."" By stimulating bargaining
over terms of service, information forcing defaults would further a paradigm of privacy-control.
In our judgment, however, the rosy scenario is unlikely.
Indeed, one must be wary about too great a reliance on either
majoritarian or information forcing defaults as a way of promoting privacy. This Article has already questioned whether
supplying more information about personal data use will induce consumers to bargain for information privacy. In making
this point, we pointed to bounded consumer rationality and,
specifically, to the power of frames. Related criticisms of the
paradigm of privacy-control are possible. One of us has already
113. Indeed, consent also implies the possibility of refusal. If "voice," that
is, bargaining about privacy terms, does not lead to change, "exit," that is, refusal, is to be possible. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRScHMAN, EXIT, VOICE,
AND LOYALTY-RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS AND
STATES (1970). Under conditions that lead to contracts of adhesion, however,
such refusal is unlikely.
114. As the previous section of this Article has suggested, however, the
GLB Act's opt-out requirement for data sharing with non-affiliates is information-forcing without any effective penalty.
115. For a more positive account of the possible effect of opt-in rules, see
Sovern, supra note 6, at 1107-13.
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used the term "the autonomy trap" to refer to a cluster of shortcomings of the paradigm of data control. 116 Of these, two are
predominant in the context of the GLB Act: (1) the strong limitations existing on individual autonomy in the current privacy
market, and (2) the shaping of individual autonomy itself
through the processing of personal data.
First, self-reliant control cannot fulfill its assigned role for
shaping privacy unless individuals can choose between different possibilities, and significant reasons for doubt exist on this
score in the context of financial services. At present, as we
have discussed, it is unlikely that consumers will be able to
identify the financial institutions with better privacy practices-if they even exist. As we have argued, privacy notices
provide a cornerstone only for a legal fiction of implied consent
to data processing by financial institutions. Yet, the consequences of this legal fiction are apt to be quite real. As Mark
Lemley concludes regarding the propertization of personal
data, turning information into commodities will lead to a "right
that is regularly signed away."1 17 Lemley believes that this will
lead to "less protection than we want to give individuals." 18
Second, individual autonomy is itself shaped by the processing of personal data. In his criticism of majoritarian defaults, Richard Craswell made a similar point. In language we
have already cited, Craswell noted "the potential for circularity
that arises when people's expectations are themselves affected
by existing legal rules."119 In similar fashion, existing law and
the practices of financial institutions shape informational selfdetermination in the context of financial privacy. The meaning
that we attribute to individual autonomy for privacy is itself
formed by the existing means by which personal data are processed. A danger of this second aspect of the "autonomy trap" is
that it can lead to a reduced sense of what is possible. A dominant trend in personal data use in cyberspace can change our
"is" to our "ought."
Constitutive Privacy. If privacy-control is a limited concept, what is the normative purpose of information privacy? In
our judgment, information privacy should be conceptualized as
116. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and Democracy in Cyberspace, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 1609, 1661-64 (1999) [hereinafter Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace].

117. Mark A. Lemley, Private Property: A Comment on Professor
Samuelson's Contribution,52 STAN. L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2000).

118. Id.
119. Craswell, supra note 84, at 507.
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a value constitutive of a democratic society. 120 Access to personal information and limits on it help form the nature of the
society in which we live and shape our individual identities.
For example, the structure of access to personal information
can have a decisive impact on the extent to which certain actions or expressions of identity are encouraged or discouraged. 121 The importance of information privacy for both individuals and democratic community necessitates attention to
boundaries about personal information.
Constitutive privacy is, therefore, a matter of line-drawing
along different coordinates to shape permitted levels of scrutiny. Standards of information privacy should be considered as
normatively defining "information territories."1 22 These territories create patterns of knowledge and ignorance of personal
data to stimulate or discourage different kinds of social expression and action.
A further point should be made about constitutive privacy.
An information privacy territory should not be expected to
function as a data fortress that isolates personal information in
some absolute sense. Personal data often involve a social reality that is external to the individual. As a result, the optimal
utilization of this information is unlikely to exist at either end
of a continuum that ranges from absolute privacy to complete
disclosure. 123 The proper social response to information privacy
issues cannot be to maximize secrecy about individuals and
their pursuits. Rather, information privacy norms should create shifting, multidimensional data preserves that insulate
120. One of us has set out this approach in a series of articles. Paul M.
Schwartz, Beyond Lessig's Code for Internet Privacy, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 743,
761-62 [hereinafter Schwartz, Lessig's Code]; Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 834-43 (2000) [hereinafter
Schwartz, Privacy and the State]; Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note
116, at 1658-66; see also Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REV. 957, 966
(1989) (stating that rather than upholding "the interests of individuals against
the demands of community," information privacy creates rules that in some
significant measure "constitute both individuals and community"). For an attempt to differentiate "constitutive privacy" from Post's work, see Schwartz,
Privacy in Cyberspace, supra, at 1667-70.
121. See Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: InformationPrivacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1408 (2000) (noting that processing of
personal information involves "questions of behavior modification and free
will").
122. See Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 116, at 1667.
123. For a similar conclusion regarding the use of personal medical information, see Schwartz, PrivacyEconomics, supra note 6, at 41.
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personal data from different kinds of observation by different
parties. Different kinds of "outing," that is, revelation of otherwise fully or partially hidden aspects of one's life, should be
prevented before different audiences. Particular attention is
needed to prevent revelation and use of data124that might chill
one's underlying capacity for decisionmaking.
The idea of constitutive privacy suggests the necessity of
involvement by democratic institutions in the creation of rules
for the use of personal data. As to the content of the necessary
rules, we turn to the general framework provided by "fair information practices" (FIPs).125 FIPs are widely considered the
building blocks of modern information privacy law; they have
been present in information privacy law and policy since the
era of mainframe computers in the 1970s.12 6 Although the expressions of FIPs in different statutes and regulations vary in
their details, sometimes crucially, we wish to offer a formulation of FIPs with seven elements: (1) defined obligations, often
statutory in nature, for processors of personal information; (2)
the maintenance of processing systems that the concerned individual can understand (transparentdata processing); (3) a requirement of notice to the individual; (4) the provision of indi-

124. Here we gingerly re-introduce the theme of autonomy. Note, however,
that we view information self-determination neither as a pre-existing quality
that is independent of society and data processing nor as a quality that is protected for its own sake (which would lead us back to "privacy-control").
Rather, our view is that information self-determination is to be promoted because democratic society turns on the underlying communicative competency
of individuals. See Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 116, at 165455.
For influential work on this perspective regarding the interplay between
self-determination, democratic society, and information privacy, see ROBERT
C.

POST,

CONSTITUTIONAL

DOMAINS:

DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 51-88 (1995). For a related explanation of the tie between privacy and "the practice of self-determination on the part of free and equal citizens," see JORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS 386, 368-70 (Wil-

liam Rehg trans., 1996). See also Spiros Sinitis, From the Market to the Polis:
The EU Directiveon the Protection of PersonalData, 80 IOWA L. REV. 445, 46366 (1995) (discussing rules on the free flow of personal data in the European
Union); Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U.
PA. L. REV. 707, 734-36 (1987) (discussing the connection between public and
private life).
125. Schwartz, Privacy in Cyberspace, supra note 116, at 1614.
126. For a description of early proposals regarding fair information practices, see DAVID H. FLAHERTY, PROTECTING PRIVACY IN SURVEILLANCE
SOCIETIES 306-07 (1989). For a more recent governmental discussion of a
somewhat different set of fair information practices, see FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-12 (1998).
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vidual choice regarding the use of her personal information; (5)
security for collected and stored data; (6) access to personal
data; (7) enforcement of privacy rights and standards, which
can involve-often in combination-individual litigation, government oversight, or industry self-regulation.12 7
Let us return to the GLB Act and default rules. If the
normative goal of this law is constitutive privacy, the rules
about financial privacy must be seen as mattering both to the
individual and society. What kind of information territories
should we seek to create? In this regard, we should consider a
warning of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse concerning dangers in the GLB Act's aftermath:
Consider the amount and kinds of information you supply just to a financial institution that may sell insurance, bank products, and securities. Combine this with the information available from other
sources, and virtually any detail of your financial affairs, health
status, spending habits, lifestyle purchases, political affiliations, religious contributions, and more can be collected by your financial instibe shared, sold, rented, or
tution. Unless you formally object, it can
128
otherwise disclosed with few exceptions.

A financial institution knows whether a customer has recently bought running shoes or other consumer products, the
name of one's physicians (as well as the nature of their speciality), and whether one has purchased orthotics or aspirin or
other kinds of health care products. Some of this information
might be embarrassing, and some of it might create potentially
damaging labels for persons or lead to other harmful results.
The cumulative impact of these disclosures can have a profound
impact on the society in which we live. Regulatory attention is
needed to control the resulting patterns of data accumulation
and use.
Note, however, that FIPs can be crafted to be majoritarian
or information forcing. Sometimes FIPs may also promote
autonomy. From the list above, we might pick "transparency,"
"notice" and, perhaps above all, "choice" as possible majoritarian and information forcing background rules. These three
examples of FIPs can also serve to enhance individual decisionmaking. FIPs, however, should not be justified largely on these
127. For discussion of the standards, see Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation:Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the
United States, 80 IOWA L. REv. 553, 557-64 (1995). See also COLIN J.
BENNETr, REGULATING PRIVACY: DATA PROTECTION AND PUBLIC POLICY IN
EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 101-11 (1992).

128. Fact Sheet 24, supra note 36, at 5.
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grounds, but on the idea that privacy, from a constitutive perspective, is also a "public good." Information privacy is a kind
of commons that requires some degree of social control to construct and then preserve.
The problems of bounded rationality, along with ever present coordination problems, make defaults a risky choice in
many contexts of information privacy. From this perspective,
FIPs should carefully mix both mandatory rules and default
rules. Where private bargaining about data processing is most
likely to fall short, mandatory rules should set immutable
standards. 129 Where potential exists for private negotiations,
FIPs should only establish default rules that set a baseline for
negotiations because the potential price of mandatory standards is regulatory rigidity.
The most important consequences of this approach for the
GLB Act is that default rules, when viewed from a norm enforcing perspective, are likely to have a limited role. As we have
argued already in this Article, the privacy market between consumers and financial institutions does not presently function
well. Under these conditions, the law should generally seek to
minimize harms that flow from reliance on bargaining among
consumers and data processors. According to Robert Cooter
and Thomas Ulen's formulation, such an approach represents
the "normative Hobbes theorem" of law: "Structure the law so
as to minimize
the harm caused by failures in private agree130
ments."
We will conclude this Article by examining two further aspects of mandatory and default rules in the context of financial
privacy. We first consider mandatory rules as found in the
GLB Act's rules for data security. We then propose that the
GLB Act's current opt-out be re-evaluated in light of social science literature concerning frames and that Congress consider a
shift to an opt-in default.
C. MANDATORY AND DEFAULT RULES: TOWARD A REVISED

GLB

ACT
The rules of the GLB Act for data security are not presented as defaults, but are mandatory in nature. As this Article noted in Part I, the GLB Act spells out three requirements
129. For a further discussion in the context of cyberspace privacy, see
Schwartz, Lessig's Code, supra note 120, at 781-84.

130. COOTER & ULEN, supranote 91, at 90.
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for data security and integrity. Financial institutions are to do
the following: (1) protect the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) prevent any anticipated
threats or hazards to the security or integrity of such records;
and (3) prevent unauthorized access to use of records that
"could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer." 131 Title V's rules concerning "pretexting," or obtaining
customer information by false pretenses, are a further response
to the question of unauthorized access to records.
Recourse to mandatory rules for security standards is wise.
It is unlikely that consumers will negotiate for an optimal level
of data security. One difficulty here relates to information
costs, which are high for consumers in this technology-driven
area. Imagine the intense level of research that consumers
would be forced to carry out in evaluating the information security standards of one bank versus another. A further difficulty
concerns the significant market power of financial institutions,
which prior to the GLB Act generally shared an incentive in
bear the burden of flawed data security and
having consumers
"pretexting." 132 Default rules for bargaining between financial
entities and consumers would not be helpful in the context of
data security.
When security standards are mandatory, however, the
danger is that of regulatory inflexibility. Data security may fall
short if structured only as command-and-control rules, which
mandate rigid outcomes and sometimes even specify the precise
means-such as the type of equipment-to be used by industry. 133 As scholars have argued concerning environmental
regulation, command-and-control regulation tends to freeze development of technologies and discourage recourse to less costly
134
alternatives.

131. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 501(b)(3), 113
Stat. 1338 (1999). The Act also requires the GLB oversight agencies to establish "appropriate standards" for data security and integrity. § 501(b).
132. For a related discussion of how credit reporting agencies shift the
problem of "identity theft" to consumers, see Lynn M. LoPucki, Human Identification Theory and the Identity Theft Problem, 80 TEx. L. REV. 89, 91-93
(2001).
133. See generally Robert N. Stavins, Economic Incentives for Environmental Regulation, in 2 DICTIONARY OF EcoNoMIcs & LAW 7 (1998) (discuss-

ing command-and-control rules in the context of environmental regulation).
134. Id.; see also Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L. REV. 129,

164-79 (1998).
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The GLB Act provides authority to the GLB Act oversight
agencies to "establish appropriate standards for the financial
institutions subject to their jurisdiction relating to administra135
tive, technical, and physical safeguards" for data security.
The GLB Act is silent on the kind of standards that these agencies should issue. The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA) of 1998 provides a good model of an approach beyond
command-and-control for developing technical standards.
COPPA provides comprehensive FIPs for children on the
Internet. As its cornerstone, COPPA generally forbids commercial Web sites from collecting information about children
without parental consent. 136 It also grants parents a right of
access to any information about their children that is collected. 137 These two requirements bring with them, however,
important technical questions as to how parents are to indicate
their consent and authenticate their identities. 138 COPPA also
contains other technical issues, including, similar to the GLB
Act, a requirement of data security. 139 COPPA states that operators of a web site directed to children must "maintain reaand
sonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security,
140
integrity of personal information collected from children."
COPPA introduces flexibility in responding to these technical issues through a statutorily authorized mechanism for regulatory negotation. Parallel to the technical regulations to be
developed under COPPA by the FTC, the statute authorizes the
industry to formulate its own technical norms. COPPA creates
a "safe harbor" for commercial web sites that follow "a set of
self-regulatory guidelines, issued by representatives of the
marketing or online industries" or by other approved persons.141 Yet, industry guidelines will receive safe harbor pro-

135. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 501(b).
136. 15 U.S.C.A. § 6502(b)(1)(b)(ii) (2001). For an overview of COPPA and
a skepticism towards it as "paternalistic and authoritarian," see Anita L. Allen, Minor Distractions:Children,Privacy, and E-Commerce, 38 HOUs. L. REV.
751, 775 (2001). Interestingly enough, Professor Allen had called for nonindividualistic justifications for information privacy laws in a previous article.
See generally Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723

(1999) (arguing that privacy is vital for liberal democracy, and that the voluntary abrogation of privacy can become a serious problem).
137. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(iii).
138. § 6501(9).
139. § 6502(b)(1)(D).
140. Id.
141. § 6503.
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tection under COPPA only if the FTC approves them. For such
approval to be given, the FTC must find that the industry
"meet the requirements" of the agency's own technical guidelines. 142 Thus, COPPA strongly seeks to channel industry
norms towards certain substantive levels. Moreover, in issuing
a rule regarding the COPPA Safe Harbor, the FTC has sought
to make industry self-regulation effective by setting tough requirements for the industry. For example, it required all web
sites making use of safe harbor self-regulation to submit to independent auditing and to provide effective enforcement requirements, including, in the alternative, "voluntary payments
to the United States Treasury in connection with an industrydirected program for violators of the guidelines."143
FTC regulations under the GLB Act should also balance
mandatory requirements for data security with regulatory
flexibility. A similar provision for regulatory negotiation
should be included in amendments to the GLB Act. The key to
making a safe harbor effective, however, will be FTC refusal to
approve any industry guidelines that provide a lesser level of
data security than the FTC's own technical safeguards. Nevertheless, industry may also be able to generate insights as to
how to provide an equivalent level of security at a lower cost to
it.
Beyond mandatory regulations, we wish to return to defaults. We have expressed doubts that an opt-in requirement
would necessarily limit much data sharing and suggest that
only a limited role is suitable for defaults in financial privacy.
Where less use will be made of defaults, there will be more
need for FIPs. Yet, the GLB Act lacks many basic elements of
FIPs. 1 " At the same time, however, the GLB Act does require
the Comptroller General to carry out a study of information
sharing among financial affiliates. 145 The report of the Comptroller General, when issued, should provide an occasion for
142. § 6503(b)(2).
143. Children's Online Privacy Protection Rule, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,750,22,759
(Apr. 27, 1999) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 312).
144. For this reason, some privacy advocates have criticized it as essentially being a data sharing statute. Thus, Marc Rotenberg, head of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, views the GLB Act as performing primarily
an alibi function in allowing Congress to claim it is doing something for privacy "without imposing any significant restrictions on how companies collect
Hairs Raised Over Data Privacy, at http'/
and use data."
www.privacydigest.com/2001/05/07 (May 7, 2001).
145. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act § 526.
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Congress to reconsider the GLB Act and the need for robust
FIPs in it.
We can imagine, however, that Congress may decide not to
provide full FIP's in a new version of the GLB Act. For that
reason, we wish to offer two more modest proposals. The first
concerns tweaking the current opt-out rule. The second concerns testing our "rosy scenario" by adopting an opt-in rule.
First, we believe that Congress and the GLB Act oversight
agencies should reconsider the GLB's "notice and opt-out" rule
in light of the social science literature regarding frames. 146 The
purpose of a notice and opt-out requirement is to provide a
mechanism reasonably designed to promote the exercise of
choice. In our judgment, the GLB Act oversight agencies, including the FTC, must do more to make sure that opt-out notices provide choice for consumers. As an initial matter, since
individuals typically devote scant resources to consumer contracts, we propose that notice and opt-out regulations require
that each notice provide the opt-out information at its start and
in a bold-faced format. Drawing more specifically on literature
regarding frames, we also suggest that a greater number of
consumers will be more likely to exercise choice if opt-out's are
proposed as preventing a change of state that will lead to a loss
of privacy. This latter point may seem abstract so we will
make it more concrete.
We have found a proposal to the FTC from the Public Citizen Litigation Group that appears to have intuitively grasped
the essence of framing effects. Public Citizen asks the FTC to
issue a rule that drafts a standardized opt-out element for GLB
Act privacy notices. 147 Its revised GLB out-opt, to be issued at
the top of the notice "in a large, bold-faced font," would state:
WE ARE ALLOWED TO DISCLOSE YOUR PRIVATE
INFORMATION TO OTHER COMPANIES UNLESS YOU TELL US
NOT TO.

146. The FTC has already issued a regulation concerning the form of privacy notices, but it speaks mostly in unhelpful generalities. For example, the
FTC informs financial institutions, "[ylou must provide a clear and conspicuous notice to each of your customers that reflects your privacy policies...."
FTC Privacy of Consumer Financial Information Final Rule, 16 C.F.R. §
313.5(a)(1) (2001). The FTC's regulation also provides, "You provide adequate
notice that the consumer can opt out of the disclosure of nonpublic personal
information to a nonaffiliated third party if you exercise an opt-in right if you
... [diesignate check-off boxes in a prominent position on the relevant forms
with the opt out notice...." Id. § 313.7(a)(2)(i), (ii)(A).
147. Public Citizen Litigation Group, supra note 66, at 1-2.
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YOU HAVE A RIGHT TO PREVENT US FROM DISCLOSING
YOUR PRIVATE INFORMATION TO OTHER COMPANIES.
BUT IF YOU DO NOT RESPOND WITHIN 30 DAYS, WE MAY
BEGIN SHARING YOUR INFORMATION. YOU WILL STILL
HAVE THE RIGHT TO TELL US TO STOP AT ANY TIME. BUT
ONCE WE HAVE SHARED INFORMATION WITH OTHER
GET IT BACK FROM THEM OR STOP
COMPANIES, WE CANNOT
148
THEM FROM USING IT.

Note that this opt-out notice presents a frame that speaks
in terms of changes of state and also identifies losses that consumers can prevent ("disclosing your private information to
other companies" and "once we have shared information with
other companies, we cannot get it back from them or stop them
from using it."). This notice is framed in a fashion that is likely
to encourage consumer consideration of the opt-out.
Finally, revising the GLB Act to contain an opt-in requirement would combine information forcing and a penalty. Despite
our doubts as to the ability of this default to dislodge a lemons
equilibrium in the privacy market with financial entities, an
opt-in has merit as a fall back proposal to FIPs. Its benefit is to
shift the burden of obtaining permission to the party who
would disclose personal data. If opt-in fails to dislodge the
lemons equilibrium in the privacy market, as we suspect it
might, there will only be as much data disclosure as takes place
at present. If, contrary to our belief, it does succeed, financial
institutions will not necessarily be obliged to offer more privacy. Rather, a "successful" opt-in might lead consumers to
trade their personal information for more financial services or a
lower price for existing services. The shift in Vermont to an
opt-in standard for financial institutions will provide interesting test results regarding the possible merits of such a revision
to the GLB Act.
In a sense, then, opt-in might not lead to heightened privacy protection. Consumers may simply bargain for more services or a lower price and not for FIPs. Yet, when constitutive
privacy is the goal, a default is to be used to defend the privacy
commons. Given bounded rationality and the pervasiveness of
coordination problems, this strategy is a risky one. We therefore end this Article by pointing once again to the limited role
that defaults are likely to play in furthering information privacy for consumers.

148. Id. at 11-12.
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CONCLUSION
In sum, the GLB Act has its failings, but ones that are instructive on a number of levels. First, it confuses notice with
autonomy. Second, it uses default rules improperly by misallocating the burden of bargaining. Third, it fails to recognize the
intractable nature of certain market failures in the privacy context and fails to appreciate the need to combine mandatory
rules and penalty defaults to enforce privacy norms. Perhaps
above all, the GLB Act does not recognize how privacy protection creates a public good. The difficulty is that private negotiations about data sharing arrangements may be insufficient
to create the necessary kind of privacy commons.
The GLB Act's notice and opt-out approach is based on an
attempt to link mandatory notices with a perceived majoritarian or perhaps information forcing default. This error rests
on a mistaken view of privacy as the "control" of personal data.
If privacy is control, one need only tell someone how their data
will be used, and give them the opportunity to say "no." Yet,
we have argued that "notice and opt-out" should not be equated
with control. Bounded rationality, differences in negotiation
strength, and coordination problems create an environment
where mandatory notices obscure rather than clarify the rights
of financial institution customers. "Notice and opt-out" has
forced companies to incur great expense providing privacy notices while doing virtually nothing to provide strong FIPs. Indeed, if privacy protection aims to preserve autonomy, it could
better serve this goal by using a penalty default, such as "notice
and opt-in." This approach might force financial institutions to
bargain with customers to procure the use of their personal information. This tactic might also encourage clear(er) explanation of the benefits of disclosure.
Even opt-in has its limits. "Opt-in" may well turn on unrealistic assumptions. The manner in which banks, stockbrokers,
and insurance companies use information, share information
with affiliates, and transfer information to third parties is
complicated-too complicated to be understood by even a very
smart lay person, let alone to be negotiated by each customer
who opens a bank account. Individuals can be induced to bargain away their privacy by manipulating frames and exploiting
collective action problems. The consequence may be that society as a whole will be left with a sub-optimal amount of pri-
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vacy. Instead of overreliance on "opting," we advocate a mixed
regime of mandatory and default, or waivable, background
rules that are ultimately to be judged by reference to the FIPs
that they put in place. FIPs are the building blocks for the
multidimensional privacy spaces necessary in a democratic society.
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